Acting and knowing in temporary and project-based organizing: turning from the practice world to a liberation praxeology? by Bredillet, Christophe et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Bredillet, Christophe, Hatcher, Caroline A., & Tywoniak, Stephane (2013)
Acting and knowing in temporary and project-based organizing : turning
from the practice world to a liberation praxeology? In Democratising man-
agement, EURAM, Istanbul, Turkey.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/61688/
c© Copyright 2013 [please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 ACTING AND KNOWING IN TEMPORARY AND PROJECT-BASED ORGANIZING: TURNING FROM THE PRACTICE WORLD TO A LIBERATION PRAXEOLOGY? 
  
Christophe Bredillet - christophe.bredillet@qut.edu.au 
QUT PROJECT MANAGEMENT ACADEMY
Stephane Tywoniak - s.tywoniak@qut.edu.au 
QUT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
Caroline Hatcher - c.hatcher@qut.edu.au 
QUT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
 
SIG: PROJECT ORGANISING 
TRACK: PROJECT ORGANISING GENERAL TRACK 
Access to this paper is restricted to registered delegates of the EURAM 2013 (European Academy of Management) Conference. 
ISBN No: 978-975-8400-35-5
Acting and knowing in temporary and project-based organizing: turning from the practice world 
to a liberation praxeology? 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this article is to offer a critical discussion about the “practice” lens and its 
weaknesses in addressing acting and knowledge & competence development in the pluralistic 
context of temporary and project-based organizing. I demonstrate that “practice turn” and 
“phronetic proposal” are dual and opposite perspectives within the “practice” world, none of 
them being fully relevant to grasp project organizing and that each of them maintain the 
opposition between the “observer” and the “natives “of the practices. I suggest an alternate style 
of reasoning in order to address the dissatisfaction in face of problems, antinomies, perplexities 
and contradictions generated by the dichotomous thinking: a liberation praxeology rooted in 
Aristotle philosophy aiming, through praxis & phronesis and practical acquired experience & 
perfecting actualization, at reconciling facts & values and means & ends, and Ethics & Politics in 
the quest for human happiness and social good through project organizing.  
Keywords: Practice turn, Emancipatory praxis, Phronesis 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is, ironically, to offer a critical discussion about the “practice” lens 
and its weaknesses in addressing acting and knowledge & competence development in the 
pluralistic context of temporary and project-based organizing. Therefore, as “reflexive” 
practitioner, I demonstrate that “practice turn” and “phronetic proposal” are dual and opposite 
perspectives within the “practice” world, none of them being fully relevant to grasp project 
organizing and that each of them maintain the opposition between the “observer” and the 
“natives “of the practices. I suggest an alternate style of reasoning in order to address the 
dissatisfaction in face of problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions generated by 
the dichotomous thinking: a liberation praxeology rooted in Aristotle philosophy aiming, 
through praxis & phronesis and practical acquired experience & perfecting actualization, at 
reconciling facts & values and means & ends, and Ethics & Politics in the quest for human 
happiness and social good through project organizing.  
 
Keywords 
Project organizing, practice turn, phronetic social science, Aristotle, emancipatory praxis, 
phronesis.  
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The purpose of this “philosophical” article is, ironically, to offer a critical discussion of the 
“practice” lens and its weaknesses to fully grasp acting and knowledge & competence 
development in the pluralistic context of temporary and project-based organizing (TPBO), 
and, in consequence, to suggest alternate style of reasoning. Ironically, but my “practice” is 
my “philosophizing” and my “philosophizing” is my “practice”! Therefore, as “reflexive” 
practitioner (Stacey, 2012, p. 112), I am conversing on the “constitutive role of practices” in 
producing organizing and social reality (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1241) taking the 
quest of eudaimonia (well-being, happiness) and eupraxia (doing well, good practice) as 
ultimate purpose of human agents and society. Thus, the pluralistic context of TPBO and its 
impact of human happiness and society provides the background for this discussion as an 
“extreme case” of organizing, revealing “complex ways of thinking about organization 
complexity” (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001, p. 980) by contrast with the more classical permanent & 
operation-based perspective. The “practice” world is not homogenous and, in this article, I 
emphasize what could be seen as a major dichotomy or “schism” (Chia & Rasche, 2010, p. 
34) within this world: the differences between the structuralism and neo-structuralism 
tradition, (e.g. Levi-Strauss (1964), Bourdieu (1990) and Foucault (1977), role of unconscious 
habitual behavior, and the interpretative and neo-interpretative tradition, e.g. Schütz (1964), 
Goffman (1982), and Taylor (1993), role of collective knowledge schemes (Rasche & Chia, 
2009), by contrast with the “phronetic” proposal (Flybjerg, 2001; Brown, 2012). In short, the 
core of the “practice turn” doxa and its strong “societism” and opposition to “methodological 
individualism” (Orlikowski, 2010, p. 27) can be contrasted with the phronetic social science 
proposed by Flyvbjerg (2001) ,offering a relevant counterpoint with regards to the conscious 
role of individuals in the context of TPBO. But each and both of these dual and opposite 
perspectives fail to offer styles of reasoning enabling to fully grasp the breadth and depth of 
organizing practices (acting and knowledge & competence development) especially in the 
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pluralistic context of TPBO. For that reason, I suggest an integrative balanced approach, 
metaphorically considering the whole “ecology of discourses”  rather the parts made of 
particular incommensurable discourses (Seidl, 2007, p. 208) in order to address the 
dissatisfaction in face of problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions generated by 
the dichotomous thinking between the practice and phronetic proposals: a liberation 
praxeology rooted on Aristotle philosophy (Eikeland, 2008)
1
 aiming, through praxis & 
phronesis and practical acquired experience & perfecting actualization, at reconciling facts & 
values and means & ends, and ethics & politics in the quest for eudaimonia.  
 
The pluralistic context of temporary and project-based organizing: Gaussian vs. 
Paretian worlds 
 
Amongst the general context of organizing
2
, the context of TPBO can be seen as a special 
“extreme case” where organizing and social phenomena are exacerbated, especially 
considering organizing practices in “action” or as something actors “do” (“structuring is a 
process and processes are structured” (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1522), in contrast to 
something actors or organizations “have” (process and structure perspectives in isolation) 
(Tsoukas, 2010, p. 47).  
 
Packendorff (1995, p. 327), summarizing previous works since Miles (1964), defines a 
temporary organization as follows:  
 
                                                          
1
 The Aristotelian philosophy involves a language that is not a modern language. And the same words may have 
different meanings for Aristotle. In this article, I use various sources for the translation of the words which hold 
dual meanings in both definition and English. Furthermore, I strongly suggest that the readers refer to Eikeland 
(2008) for a detailed discussion of Aristotelian phronesis.  
2
 According to Weick, organizing is “…a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by means of 
sensible interlocked behaviors. To organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent actions into sensible 
sequences that generate sensible outcomes” (Weick, 1979, p. 3; italics from the orlginal).  
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- “is an organized (collective) course of action aimed at evoking a non-routine process 
and/or completing a non-routine product; [Proposition 1] 
- has a predetermined point in time or time-related conditional state when the 
organization and/or its mission is collectively expected to cease to exist; [Proposition 
2] 
- has some kind of performance evaluation criteria; [Proposition 3] 
- is so complex in terms of roles and number of roles that it requires conscious 
organizing efforts (i.e. not spontaneous self-organizing).” [Proposition 4]  
 
TPBO is characterized by a “pluralistic context embodying multiple objectives, diffuse power, 
and knowledge –based works process” (Denis et al., 2007, p. 179). This context, described as 
“Chaordic” (Hock, 1995), shows increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity 
affecting organizations and the socio-economic environment within which they operate. Two 
main dimensions are considered  having a key impact in organizational studies and 
organizing: uncertainty, and its two dimensions: volatility and ambiguity, and complexity.  
 
Because action takes place over time, and because the future is unknowable, action is 
inherently uncertain (Aristotle, 1926, 1357a). Acts involve time, irreversibility, 
indetermination and contingence, uncertainty, and therefore risk (see Knight, 1921: external 
environment, asymmetric information and related market perspective) and Keynes, 1937: 
known unknowns). Volatility, as rate and unpredictability of change in an environment over 
time which create uncertainty about future conditions, and ambiguity, as degree of uncertainty 
inherent in perceptions of the environmental state irrespective of its change over time, are 
therefore two dimensions of uncertainty. (Carson et al.,2006, p. 1059).  
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TPBO situations are complex systems in the way they involve interdependence and 
connections between actors, “objects” (micro,  meso, & institutional- level), and the wider 
context (macro-level). Drawing on Complexity Science, Andriani & McKelvey (2007, 2009), 
Boisot & McKelvey (2010), and McKelvey & Boisot (2009), based on Paretian assumption, 
and infinite variance call for a connectionist ontology rooted 1) on adaptive tension between 
the internal variety of a social system and the variety external solicitation and 2) on 
connectivity and interdependency in social phenomena. Thus “contemporary organizing is 
increasingly understood to be complex, dynamic, distributed, mobile, transient, and 
unprecedented, and as such, we need approaches that will help us theorize these kinds of 
novel, indeterminate, and emergent phenomena […]” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 
1240).  
 
The understanding and the making of organizing is therefore supported by the following 
classification: 
 
- on the one hand, a class rooted in Gaussian assumption and atomistic ontology (Boisot 
& McKelvey, 2010), 1
st
 order complexity, classifications of phenomena governed by a 
tradition of "natural sciences" (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001), rationality, universality, 
context free, objective reality and value-free decision making (Cicmil & Hodgson, 
2006, p.11) and; 
- on the other hand, a class rooted in Paretian assumption and connectionist ontology 
(Boisot & McKelvey, 2010), 2
nd
 order complexity (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001), Critical 
Systems Practice (Jackson, 2003), Complex Responsive Processes perspective 
(Stacey, 2010), "the organizational reality, which is often messy, ambiguous, 
fragmented and political in character" (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 60) leading to the 
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quest of Verstehen, “the intuitive quickness of enlightened understanding” (Schütz, 
1964, p. 4), addressing context dependent particular problems and situations (Aram & 
Salipante, 2003), and to middle-range theorizing (Merton, 1949), local “petits récits” 
(Lyotard, 1984) or middle-level theorizing (Gell-Mann, 2002). 
 
This distinction has been acknowledged by authors such as Bruner's distinction between 
logico-scientific and narrative modes of thought (Bruner, 1986; Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001), and 
Declerck's distinction between operational and project activities (Ansoff et al., 1976, Declerck 
et al. 1983). The choice of these authors is of interest as Declerck claimed to build of Moles's 
work, a well-regarded praxeologist representative of the Strasbourg School, on theory of acts 
(Moles & Caude, 1964; Moles & Rohmer, 1977) and both authors were the first to raise these 
distinctions.  
 
The “practice” lens and the dichotomy “practice turn” vs. “phronetic” proposal 
 
Recognizing the limitation of the positivist approaches (Gaussian assumption, first class 
above) to handle particular social empirical phenomena, the practice lens leads to shift the 
focus from what actors / organizations have (e.g strategy as something an organization 
“have”) to what actors do (Tsoukas, 2010, p. 47). The origins of the practice perspective can 
be traced to Wittgenstein (1951), Heidegger (1962), but the past few decades have seen a 
proliferation of theories of practice to the extent that we can speak about a “practice turn” in 
the social sciences generally (Reckwitz, 2002; Rouse, 2007; Schatzki et al., 2001; Schatzki, 
2001, 2002, 2005). A vast amount of literature (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990; de Certeau, 1984; 
Foucault, 1977; Giddens, 1979) has been published since the early 1980s dealing with 
practice in social theory (Schatzki et al., 2001; Reckwitz, 2002);for example Strategy-as-
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Practice (SAP) (for an overview, see Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2008; Rasche & 
Chia, 2009; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). These works aim at overcoming the dualism 
between “individualism” and “societism” (Schatzki, 2005). As Whittington (2006, p. 614) 
puts it, "Practice theorist aim to respect both the efforts of individual actors and the workings 
of the social." The three core themes for practice theory (practices, praxis and practitioners) 
are forming interrelated parts of a whole (Giddens, 1984).  
 
In the temporary and project-based organizations space, the practice approach has gained 
momentum (e.g. Bredillet, 2004; Bechky, 2006; Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil et al, 2006; Hällgren & 
Wilson, 2008; Blomquist et al., 2010; Hällgren & Söderholm, 2011; Sanderson, 2012; 
Hällgren & Lindhal, 2012).  
 
Feldman & Orlikowski (2011) uncover the key set of practice theory principles, recognizing 
however that various practice thinkers highlight different aspects of the relationships between 
the specific instances of situated action, the social world, and elaborate distinctive logics 
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1241):  
 
1. “that situated actions are consequential in the production of social life, 
2. that dualisms are rejected as a way of theorizing, and 
3. that relations are mutually constitutive.” 
 
Furthermore, Vaara & Whittington (2012) make clear that the “practice turn” “defines itself in 
opposition to methodological individualism”, how “praxis relies on practices”, and “how 
social structures and human agency link together in the explanation of action” (Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012, p. 288). Interestingly, Vaara & Whittington (2012) do not make any 
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reference to “phronetic social science” (Brown, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012; 
Macintyre, 2007) in their otherwise thorough paper.  
 
By contrast with the core “practice turn” stream, the phronetic proposal, claiming to be rooted 
in Aristotelian tradition, is “intended  to foster ‘balance and integration’ among a diversity of 
methodologies and approaches, quantitative as well as qualitative. With regard to the second, 
he [Flyvbjerg] is insistent that the natural science model must not be the standard by which 
social research in general and the phronetic model in particular is judged, still less 
validated.” (Healy, 2008, p. 137). The most important differentiating characteristics of the 
proposal are the emphasis of consciousness of the actors, power relations and value-relations 
in the context of problem-driven, practically oriented, deliberative and evaluative research 
aiming at “contributing to society’s value-rational deliberation and action” (Schram & 
Caterino, 2006, p. 83—84). Another characteristic of this proposal is its non-paradigmatic (or 
post-paradigmatic) status (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Schram, 2004, p. 432, note 23; Van de Ven & 
Johnson, 2006, p. 805, note 2).  
 
Brown (2012, p. 446—447) explores similarities and differences between practice and 
phronetic turns, summarized in table 1(see page 38) . As he specifies, “no attempt at 
reconciliation will be made – any such attempt could only succeed by introducing 
unproductive distortions”. (Brown, 2012, p. 441). While Brown analysis is very relevant and 
relies on an Aristotelian phronesis, it seems he misses one key point raised by Eikeland 
(2008): the phronetic turn can be barely said “Aristotelian” or rooted in a relevant 
interpretation of phronesis for one major reason: the “expert” or “phronetic researcher” 
remains an outsider to the “practice” and this is in contradiction with Aristotelian thought (for 
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a full critique of phronetic social science, and aspects linked to misconception of episteme, 
value –rationality, see Eikeland, 2008, pp. 43—44 and note 28).  
 
------------------------- 
Table 1 
------------------------- 
 
Therefore the practice lens offers a contrasted classification of perspectives with regards to 
practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development and their mutual relation:  
 
- the “practice turn” can be seen as still rooted in a kind of “social scientific” spirit – 
attempting to balance rigor and relevance – with a general focus on “knowledge and 
inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238),  
- while the phronetic proposal suggests moving from a “turn” to a “revolution”, a 
“practice revolution” with an impact on society – focusing on relevance, and that “our 
knowing is ‘in’ our action” (Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana & Varela (1998, p. 27—
29) similarly define knowing as “effective action”, and write that “all doing is 
knowing, and all knowing is doing.” In Practice theory words, Giddens (1984, p. 4) 
explicates knowledgeability as “inherent within the ability to ‘go on’ within the 
routines of social life”.  
 
TPBO, practice (acting) & knowledge and competence development: The “practice” 
world is not enough  
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On the basis of the previous discussion I argue that – in the context of TPBO and inherent 
uncertainty where “the individual independence is embodied in collective dependence” 
(Gomez, 2006, p. 222) – the “practice” world is not enough for fully capture the mutual 
relationships between practice (acting), knowledge and, competence development for three 
main reasons:  
 
1. It doesn’t address well the temporary and project-based organizing phenomena; 
2. It is anchored in a dichotomous thinking about practice (acting) and knowledge and 
competence development; 
3. Because of this dichotomous thinking, it doesn’t fully clarify the problem of 
conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory”.  
 
Coming back to Packendorff (1995, p. 327) definition of temporary organizations, we can 
note that the non-routine process and product involving explicit knowledge (proposition 1) is 
not the primary focus of practice turn advocating “habitus” and routines anchored in the tacit, 
and sometimes implicit, dimension of knowledge
3
. Furthermore the conscious organizing 
efforts (i.e. not spontaneous self-organizing) (proposition 4) in a pluralistic context principle 
is in contradiction with the practice turn concept of unconscious behaviour and ideas such as 
pure spontaneous emergence of organizing phenomena and/or the concept of autopoeisis.  
 
The time limitation of the temporary organization (proposition 3) and the performance 
evaluation (proposition 3) aspects involve the recognition of making means and ends explicit 
and collective deliberation about them including facts and values that is the recognition of 
                                                          
3
 While addressing the knowledge embedded in practice, I refer to Polanyi (1962, 1966) notion of tacit 
knowledge, by contrast to Nonaka (1994) notion, emphasizing more the "implicit" dimension in articulation with 
the explicit dimension of knowledge. (Gourlay, 2006). Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962, 1966) is contextual, 
personal, and practice-based. It cannot be made explicit. Implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge can be 
converted back and forth according to Nonaka's SECI cycle (1994).  
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some degree of rationalization of everyday practice and experience with the support of 
analytic and epistemic effort (“epistemic impulses)” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 23, p. 46). With 
regards to practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development, the empirical 
observation suggested by both the practice and phronetic proposals, while claiming rejecting 
any dualism (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1241—1243), do not pay full 
tribute to the necessary acquired practical experience as way of knowing involving being 
native of situations and actions (Eikeland, 2008, p. 35) and not just an “empirical observer” or 
“engaged scholar” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). As Eikeland (2008) poses, “knowledge 
and competence is increasingly developed from within practical contexts...” (p. 21). Based on 
accurate reading of Aristotle, Lalonde et al. (2012) aptly address this point: “This work [An 
empirical investigation of the project situation: PM practice as an inquiry process] should be 
considered, among others (e.g., Bourgault & Lagacé, 2002; Bourgault et al., 2006), as a 
vehicle for experiential or in-action teaching styles.” (p. 429, [text added]).  
 
A broader consideration is that the way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” 
has to be made clear. According to Eikeland (2008, pp. 25), three kind of traditions can be 
considered: 1) Covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), 2) 
Statistical generalizations and, 3) Standards. They have quite different position in relation to 
what their function is. In case of covering laws, the key aspect is whether they can be used to 
predict or be falsified. The explanations must be made “as if“ observed facts follow the 
theoretical assumptions, premises, initial conditions, assertions, and implications. One single 
counter fact is enough to falsify such theory. In case of statistical generalizations, one cannot 
surely speak about falsification, but rather about more or less extreme cases, and finite or 
infinite variances and laws of distribution (e.g. see Boisot & McKelvey (2010) in their use of 
complexity science and power-law to demonstrate that “modernist”” and “postmodernists are 
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addressing the two ends of the same phenomena, at one end of the power-law being the 
Gaussian world, at the other end being the Paretian world). The last case of generalization is 
standards. Here standards can be defined as “fixed points or “ideals” for practitioners within 
certain areas, saying something about what it means to perform a certain kind of activity 
competently or, according to a, saying something about what it means to perform a certain 
kind of activity competently or, according to certain quality.” (p. 26). The meaning doesn’t 
include standards understood as just average norms, arbitrary or imposed by external bodies 
(e.g. Brunsson et al, 2000). Here, such standards are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively 
influenced by any counter facts. Standards are made by the success of virtuoso performers, 
and they “change when someone finds a better way of doing, making or using something” (p. 
26). The key characteristics of such standards are that “not everybody should or could realize 
them equally or fully” (p. 26), “their non-arbitrary character, their immanence as patterns to 
practice, and “ways-of-doing-things”, and their practical inevitability in human life as either 
implicit or explicit, vague or more exact standards of measurement, as standards of validity of 
excellence” (p. 26). Contrary to arbitrary standards, which can be conventional, unnecessary, 
or enforced, non-arbitrary standards are necessary as they express an existential necessity that 
is what it means to be or to do something. Such standards are to be observed practically from 
within the practice and they are impossible to be observed just from outside, by perception. 
The position of the “observer” is thus quite different between these three traditions. In the first 
two (covering laws and statistical generalizations) the observer is detached and disengaged 
from the situations and external objects about which they are building theories in trying to 
make sense of specific data. In the case of “standards”, the observer is the practitioner dealing 
with things and theorizing his own practice. (Eikeland, 2008, p. 27) and there is no dichotomy 
between practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development.  
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Then, while the practice world is not enough or present major contradictions to fully address 
the problem of the dichotomous thinking about practice and knowledge & competence 
development in the context of TPBO, the following question is still open and responses need 
to be brought.  
 
“In the context of TPBO, what kind of style of reasoning is required in order to move 
beyond the prevalent dichotomous thinking and to reconcile practice (acting) with 
knowledge and competence development?”  
 
Toward a liberation praxeology 
 
I argue that, if we want to free ourselves of the above-mentioned dichotomous thinking, we 
need to develop an integrative style of reasoning, recognizing that  
 
- We are dissatisfied in face of the exposed problems, antinomies, perplexities and 
contradictions; As Hacking put it: "We feel we have overcome our ancestors, when in 
fact we are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new ways." (Hacking, 
2002b, p. 2). Aristotle says that right method in philosophy begin by noticing 
contradictions in popular belief, or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of 
the wise; 
- Practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development should be embedded in 
practical contexts (Eikeland, 2008, p. 47); 
- A dialogical and or dialectical mode of thought and action should be privileged as 
integrative for moving away any dichotomous thinking and choosing one side of the 
dichotomy (Eikeland, 2008, p. 48) and recognizing the whole dynamic of 
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classification systems; Hacking (2002, p. 4) states that the essence of a style of 
reasoning is classification, “and also something need for thought itself”. Each style of 
reasoning introduces new objects, new classes of objects, generating new classes of 
entities and new onto-epistemological debates about their reality and the way of 
knowing about them. It creates its own appropriate “very criteria of truth” and  is 
“self-authenticating” (Hacking, 2002, p. 4). Hacking (2002, p. 10), while reflecting 
about classifications posits that:  
 
"The human and the social sciences do not differ from natural ones primarily because 
they deal in what are called social constructions, or because they require 'Verstehen' 
rather than explanation, prediction and control. They differ because there is a 
dynamical interaction between the classifications developed in the social sciences, and 
the individuals or behaviour classified." 
 
He exposes the idea of "interactive classifications" (Hacking, 2002, p. 11) and 
"looping effects" (Hacking, 1995) about "how classification affect us and how we 
create new classes anew". (Hacking, 2002, p. 12).  
 
I suggest here a liberation praxeology, unequivocally rooted in Aristotle philosophy, which 
can offer such an integrative approach, and outline below some key tenets of this approach. 
 
Praxeology 
 
Praxeology is defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, praxis and practices 
and, if its origin can tracked back to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (1926), the word 
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praxeology is accredited to Louis Bourdeau in his "Théorie des sciences" (1882, last but one 
chapter; Ostrowski, 1967, p. 21). A presentation of the origins of Praxeology (Petruszewycz, 
1965; Ostrowski, 1967), and more generally of works supported by a "praxeological intent
4
" 
(Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13), through an anthology of historical literature shows the richness 
of the concept, spanning from Economics (Austrian School: Von Mises, Hayek, Penrose) to 
Political Science (Machiavelli, von Clausewitz, Aron), through Moral (La Fontaine, La 
Rochefoucauld), Philosophy (Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz), Novel (Balzac, Walder, Doyle, 
Poe), Social Psychology (Daval), Behaviorism (Watson), Mathematics & Probability (Pascal, 
Leibniz, Bernouilli), Theory of Risk & Economics (Massé), Games Theory & Economic 
Behavior (Guilbaud, Von Neumann), Tektology with the concept of ‘conjunction’ (act of 
joining) and dialectical materialism (Bogdanov in Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 16 and in Le 
Moigne, 2007, p. 118) … and its comprehensiveness. We can mention further development in 
the area of Education & Learning (Pascal & Bertram, 2012), Social Science, Strategy as 
Practice, Project as Practice (e.g. references in the text above in § Practice lens…) 
 
Liberation 
 
Gustavo Gutiérrez (1988), a Peruvian theologian and Dominican priest, is regarded as the 
founder of Liberation Theology. Liberation theology is a school of thought that explores the 
relationship between Christian  theology and political activism, particularly in areas of social 
justice, poverty, and human rights. The main methodology of liberation theology is to do 
theology (i.e. speak of God) from the viewpoint of the economically poor and oppressed of 
the human community.  
 
                                                          
4
 One can speak of "praxeological intent" when an author is concerned by human actions in a sufficiently 
detached manner, either for techniques and means (technological studies), and for ends and values (moral 
studies) (translation by the author. See Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13) 
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According to the Aristotelian praxeological perspective advocated, we can put forward that 
the ultimate purpose of TPBO is achieving eudaimonia (human well-being, happiness) and 
social good through “Ethics” (Aristotle, 1926) and related “Politics” (Aristotle, 1944). 
Reasoning about temporary and project based organizing in a praxeological liberation lens is 
thus about knowing and acting, on the basis of Ethics and Politics, from the viewpoint of the 
development of well-being, happiness and social good. Furthermore, this liberation aspect is 
supported by the dialogical and dialectical mode of reasoning and action suggested above and 
the recognition of the dynamic and interactive relationship with any classification systems we 
may consider e.g. everyday practices and arbitrary vs. non arbitrary standards (Eikeland, 
2008, p. 26), differentiating organizing episodes (Tsoukas, 2010) vs. recognizing that, in the 
context of temporary and project based organizing, these episodes are intertwined and 
interacts with each other, universal vs. particular, general epistemic accounts vs. narratives 
and/or case studies, abstract vs. concrete, deductive vs. inductive vs. abductive logic, 
theoretical pluralism (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 42—43).  
 
The mediating role of Praxis and Phronesis 
 
At the heart of the liberation praxeology is the mediating role of Praxis (as a way of knowing 
activity) and Phronesis (as a knowledge form).  
 
For Aristotle (1926), the possession of three intellectual virtues (techne (artistic or technical 
knowledge, craft), episteme (as theoretike) (“theoretical” knowledge) and phronesis (practical 
wisdom but includes both intellectual excellence AND excellence of character), along with 
the possession of ethical virtues, enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia (well-being, 
happiness). Eudaimonia actually requires activity, action, exhibiting virtue (good character), 
Page 18 / 38 
and excellence in reason (rational activity). Theoretical or Philosophical wisdom (sophia) and 
intuitive reason or intelligent intuition (nous) do not consider the means to human happiness 
at all, for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Practical wisdom (phronesis) 
does this (Aristotle, 1926, 1143b). Phronesis, as knowledge form, is developed through a 
specific type of empeira (practical acquired experience), a “way of knowing as activity” 
named praxis (Eikeland, 2008, p. 526).  
 
Vazquez (1977) offers a clear and simple definition of the term when he wrote:  
 
“Praxis…is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of 
the world, but is also a guide to its transformation…” (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). 
 
Praxis is a particular form of activity, a reflexive activity underlying rational action. It is 
concerned with change, is present and future oriented, requires anticipation of the effect of 
action, rather than the interpretation of past or prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 
1992, p. 156). Praxis is “a specific form of activity based on knowledge informed by theory 
and performed according to certain ethical and moral principles for political ends.” (Warry, 
1992, p. 157). Praxis offers an important focus for practitioners and researchers in social 
science, one in which theory is integrated with practice at the point of intervention. Simply 
stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic and applied research 
by providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory, takes place 
(Warry, 1992, p. 156). We can now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based 
on reflection. It is action which embodies certain qualities. These include a commitment to 
eudaimonia (well-being, happiness) and the search for truth, and respect for others. It is the 
action of people who are free, who are able to act for themselves. Moreover, praxis is always 
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risky. It requires that a person “makes a wise and prudent practical judgement about how to 
act in this situation” (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in Smith, 1999, 2011). Praxis as 
such aims at the liberation of individuals or communities from the alienating aspects of 
everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist forces constraining every day 
actions or activities. (Warry, 1992, p. 157; Frankenberg, 1988, p. 326—327). As Warry 
(1992, p. 157) puts it:  
 
“Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are 
dialogic and participatory in nature. […]. Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a 
specific form of activity-activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed 
according to ethical and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer both 
point to “emancipatory praxis”, which appeals to communicative practice aimed at 
overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral and 
political activity aimed at the liberation of individuals or communities from alienating 
aspects of everyday practices.” 
 
With regards to knowledge, competence and ways of knowing as activities (i.e. practice), 
Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from 
within practical contexts…making organisational learning in work places and all cooperative 
endeavours – i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and improvement – increasingly 
important in general” (pp. 21—22). This relation between knowing and practicing is also 
acknowledged by Weisinger & Salipante (2000): "The knowing is bound with the practicing 
of seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated learning and practicing" (p. 387). The 
logic of “Knowing-in-Practice” is fully realized through “Knowing-as-Practicing” following 
recursive logic between “theorizing practice and practicing theory” and the fact that 
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“theorizing practice is itself a practice” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). Van de Ven 
& Johnson (2006, p. 803) in their plea in favor of engaged scholarship argue that  
 
“To bridge the gap between theory and practice, we need a mode of inquiry that converts 
the information provided by both scholars and practitioners into actions that address 
problems of what to do in a given domain.”  
 
As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the 
student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.”  
 
For Aristotle, praxis, phronesis and ethics are inseparable. As phronesis (practical wisdom, 
prudence) is both intellectual excellence and excellence of character, we cannot be 
intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good (Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). 
Phronesis cannot be acquired alone independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is 
impossible to separate phronesis from other ethical virtues: “we cannot be prudent without 
being good and we cannot be fully good without being prudent, taking the particulars of the 
situation into account” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 64). The focus of the particulars of the situation 
leads Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 666) to ask the question “Apart from being inherently 
value-laden, what is it about practical matters that requires human agents to have practical 
wisdom instead of merely scientific or craft knowledge?” Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum 
(1990, pp. 70-75) indicates three reasons: 1) practical matters change over time, and new 
problems call for new responses, 2) practical matters are inherently ambiguous, 3) Nussbaum 
(1990, p. 74) observes that “Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply 
contain some ultimately particular and non-repeatable elements”. Kondrat (1992) further 
says:  
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"Praxis is the form of reasoning appropriate to social, political, or other interactive 
contexts in which the individual, drawing on experience to provide a grasp of the 
immediate situation, reasons how to act prudently and correctly in a given set of 
circumstances. Prudence supersedes effectiveness as the relevant virtue in such cases. 
Indeed, the prudent person may be called on to make choices among several potentially 
effective (or equally ineffective) courses of action." (Kondrat, 1992, p. 239). 
 
Another question immediately comes to mind concerning the kind of  rationality mobilized by 
human  agents in the course of action: Are they differentiating or reconciling formal abstract 
rationality (Kondrat, 1992) from substantive rationality (Kondrat, 1992), situated reasoning, 
espoused theory from theory-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974), with regards to uncertainty 
about the mode of action they adopt in specific situations? Warry(date) offers an authoritative 
answer with regards to the mediating role of praxis and phronesis (both part empeiria – 
practical acquired experience), between past and future, between poeisis & techne and theoria 
& episteme, as well as between two kind of activities (aesthesis - perception) and (energeia – 
perfecting actualization): 
 
"Gadamer's observation that understanding and interpretation must be integrated into the 
"moment" of application is critical (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273—274; see also Bernstein, 
1983, p. 159). Praxis, as a particular form of activity, can serve as a focal point through 
which the discursive testing of theory is grounded through decision making and 
experience (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground 
for those interested in basic and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in 
which action, informed by theory takes place." (Warry, 1992, p. 156).  
Page 22 / 38 
 
Thus, praxis and phronesis, in their mediating role serve as focal point through which 
dichotomies are integrated, and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 
314; Gadamer, 1975), and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal 
rationality and the substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management 
authors such as Cicmil & Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 
13), Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9) and  Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a 
similar view.  
 
Reconciling Means and Ends, Facts and Values: Ethics is Politics 
 
An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and phronesis and to what 
Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the phronetic gap”, is that the Aristotelian tradition 
enables us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 668), and to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and thinking (knowledge & competence 
development), factual statements and evaluative judgments.  
 
We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world. For him, human agents and 
natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or ends (purposes). From a factual 
statement such as “He/She (Project Manager – PM) meets recurrently and successfully the 
project objectives” we can infer the evaluative judgment “He/She is a good PM”. 
Teleologically, classifying someone as a PM is to think about the purposes he/she pursues 
with regards to the functions or roles he/she fulfill or the way he/she is expected to behave, 
“not conceiving [him/her] as ahistorical selves or abstract individuals” (Tsoukas & 
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Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus calling a PM “good” is to make a factual statement about 
what an acknowledged “good” PM does, and not referring to a list of attributes that he/she 
should meet. A concept such as “good” is not an abstract entity or category in a classification 
system, but is embedded in the activity, particular context and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 
113). Calling a particular action “good” means what a “good” PM would (is expected) do in 
the situation and is therefore making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 670) reconciling facts and values. A direct implication is that the 
development of knowledge and competence should be made through practical acquired 
experience (empeiria) and perfecting actualization (energeia) and not just through abstract, 
distant and external observation. We can see here the alignment with the way of 
conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” as “Standards” (Eikeland, 2008, p.26). 
Developing knowledge and competence is done entering the tradition of a community of 
practice (or practitioners) (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; Brown & Duguid, 1991) sharing 
common goals (ends – will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 121)) and way of 
achieving them (means, but with the underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well 
(eupraxia)
5
. Being part of the community (i.e. Polis) doesn’t involve blind acceptance of 
standards, conventions, norms (nomos – laws) but at the same time the acceptance of 
historically developed laws and collective debates, deliberations about them leading to 
possibly changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670). As 
Castoriadis (1991, p.104) points out:  
 
“If the human world were fully ordered, either externally or through its own “spontaneous 
operation”, if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the “nature of society”; 
or by the “laws of history”, then there would be no room for political thinking and no 
                                                          
5
 The distinction ends and means in Aristotle is not an easy topic. For an in-depth discussion see e.g Eikeland, 
2008, p.194—196). 
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sense in asking what the proper law is or what justice is. [...] If a full and certain 
knowledge (episteme) of the human domain were possible, politics would immediately 
come to an end [...]”.  
 
Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly adds: “…in the social domain in general, and in 
organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together”. Thus, 
through praxis and phronesis, “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the achievement of human 
happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).   
 
Concluding comments 
 
Recognizing the limitations of the “practice world” to bring convincing answer to the problem 
of acting and knowing in the pluralistic context of temporary and project-based organizing, I 
suggest a liberation praxeology, in other words, coming back to the essence of the Aristotelian 
philosophy.  
 
This style of reasoning fully recognizes the inseparability being praxis, phronesis, and the 
quest for eudaimonia. Moreover, the mediating role of praxis and phronesis in reconciling any 
dichotomous thinking into the “moment” of practical acquired experience (empeiria) and 
perfecting actualization (energeia) as activities BEING both ways of knowing AND 
knowledge, “knowing-as-practicing”, practice (acting) AND knowledge & competence 
development, is fully acknowledged. With Aristotle’s teleological view of the world, a direct 
consequence is the inseparability between praxis, phronesis and the quest for eudaimonia, is 
the reconciliation between factual and value statements: a “good” PM is a fact, 
acknowledging what a “good” PM does. Furthermore, in an Aristotelian perspective, being 
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“good” means to take part of a community of practice or practitioners, in the “way-of-doing-
things”, and therefore taking part of the debates and deliberations about ends, means and laws 
having in mind the achievement of eudaimonia (human happiness) as ultimate goal. 
According to this perspective, ethics IS politics.  
 
This liberation praxeology style of reasoning addresses the limits of the “practice world” 
raised above with regards to its relevance to fully grasp the mutual relationships between 
practice (acting, and I can now “acting well” and for human happiness, in Aristotelian 
tradition) and knowledge and competence development in the pluralistic context of temporary 
and project-based organizing, i.e.:  
 
- The mediating role of praxis and phronesis in reconciling any dichotomous thinking 
into the “moment” of practical acquired experience (empeiria) and perfecting 
actualization (energeia) as activities BEING both ways of knowing AND knowledge is 
appropriate to TPBO (proposition 1); 
- The reconciliation means/ends and facts/values is relevant to TPBO (proposition 2, 
proposition 3); 
- The necessary debate and deliberation aspects and the clear Ethics and Politics 
dimensions are well suited for TPBO (proposition 4). 
 
Additionally, this style of reasoning fully recognizes: 
 
- That what has been brought from the past (Aristotle) is still actual and help to 
overcome current exposed problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions; 
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- That Practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development are embedded in 
practical contexts; 
- A dialogical and or dialectical mode of reasoning and action as integrative for moving 
away any dichotomous thinking, and clarifying the way of conceptualizing 
“universals” or “general theory” that is the “standards” tradition.  
 
Obviously, Aristotle philosophy is far broader than the few borrowings made here, and I 
would add that the discussions about each concept such phronesis, praxis… have given birth 
to hundreds of books.  
 
Ultimately, I do hope reading this paper will provide an opportunity for energeia and further 
debates!  
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Table 1: Summary of the commonalities and distinctions between practice and phronetic 
turn (after Brown, 2012).  
 Practice turn Phronetic turn 
Commonalities There are features of practices which are not specific to the single 
case and thus can be theorised. 
Anti-positivism / constructivism (p. 442) 
Rejecting the distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘positive’ 
theory so central to a particular kind of modern social science. (p. 
445) 
 Focus on practices to bypass the relationship between agency 
(subjective knowledge) and structure (objective knowledge) (p. 
442) 
Distinctions Social practices Good life (contemplation of the 
good) 
 Morality Ethics 
 Unconsciousness Consciousness  
Phronesis (faculty of reason 
shaped by experience) 
 Instinct: immersion in the 
habitus 
Instinct: hexis and product of 
an education in the virtues 
 Christian / Kantian ethical 
thought 
Simplicity is at root for virtue 
Greek ethical thought 
Virtue must be self-aware 
 
